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Abstract 
Many recent evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology studies have tested 
hypotheses by examining correlations between variables measured at a group-level (e.g., state, 
country, continent). In such analyses, variables collected for each aggregation are often taken to be 
representative of the individuals present within them, and relationships between such variables are 
presumed to reflect individual-level processes. There are multiple reasons to exercise caution when 
doing so, including: (1) the ecological fallacy, whereby relationships observed at the aggregate level 
do not accurately represent individual-level processes; (2) non-independence of data points, which 
violates assumptions of the inferential techniques used in null hypothesis testing; and (3) cross-cultural 
non-equivalence of measurement (differences in construct validity between groups). We provide 
examples of how each of these gives rise to problems in the context of testing evolutionary 
hypotheses about human behavior, and we offer some suggestions for future research.  
 
Keywords: Ecological Fallacy; Cross-cultural Research; Research  
Methods; Simpson’s Paradox; Non-independence; Measurement Equivalence
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1. Introduction 
Many hypothesis-testing techniques used by evolutionary behavioral scientists involve examining 
degrees of covariation between two or more variables and making inferences based on such 
relationships (e.g., analysis of variance, Pearson correlation). This approach may be applied to a 
number of different research designs that examine variation at different, hierarchically organized levels 
(e.g., individuals versus groups; see Figure 1), and hypothesis tests at different levels often requires 
different analytic approaches. For example, the comparative method involves examining variation 
between species in order to learn about the phylogenetic history of traits within groups of animals, e.g., 
among great apes (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Wasserman, 1993). Within the same species, 
between-population differences can be used to study the evolution of genetic differences between 
populations (Burger, Kirchner, Bramanti, Haak, & Thomas, 2007; Powell, Shennan, & Thomas, 2009) 
and developmental plasticity (West-Eberhard, 2003). Within a given population, between-individual 
differences may also illuminate the maintenance of genetic variation (Cagliani et al., 2012) and 
developmental plasticity (Frankenhuis & Panchanathan, 2011). 
 
 
--Please insert Figure 1 about here -- 
 
Over the past few years, evolutionary behavioral scientists have increasingly used macro-level 
data (e.g., region, state or country) to test hypotheses about inter-individual and intra-individual 
processes (see Figure 1). Investigations using these techniques have addressed topics such as the 
effects of ecological pathogen stress on crime, values and cognitive ability (e.g., Cashdan & Steele, 
2013; Eppig, Fincher, & Thornhill, 2010; Hackman & Hruschka, 2013; Shrira, Wisman, & Webster, 
2013; Thornhill & Fincher, 2011), parent-offspring conflict over mate choice (e.g., Apostolou, 2010), 
sex ratios (both operational and offspring sex ratios: e.g., Barber, 2000; Dama, 2011, 2012, 2013; 
Kruger & Nesse, 2006; Kruger & Schlemmer, 2009; Thomas, Daoust, Elguero, & Raymond, 2013), 
mate preferences (e.g., DeBruine, Jones, Crawford, Welling, & Little, 2010; DeBruine, Jones, Little, 
Crawford, & Welling, 2011; Moore et al., 2013), pair bonding (e.g., Quinlan & Quinlan, 2008), parental 
investment (e.g., Barber, 2003; Marlowe, 2003), homosexual preferences (Barthes, Godelle, & 
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Raymond, 2013), personality (e.g., Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008), economic decision-making 
(e.g., Marlowe et al., 2008, 2011), and sexual dimorphism (Wells, 2012).  
Analyses of cross-cultural correlations have several merits, including interdisciplinary appeal, 
intersecting the social and biological sciences, and investigating populations outside of the ‘Western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, educated, and democratic’ (WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010) populations typically sampled from by psychologists. Despite these merits, macro-level data are 
characterized by inherent limitations in what they can tell us about individual-level processes. 
Problems inherent in extrapolation across levels of analyses are not limited to cross-cultural 
correlations on humans, but also pertain to studies of life history. For example, researchers may 
generate predictions based on individual-level optimization, but test these predictions by observing 
variation between populations in life-history traits (e.g., Anderson, 2010). Given that patterns of 
variation at different levels of analysis (species, population, individual) are influenced by multiple 
mechanisms (e.g., genetic variations, facultative trade-offs, phenotypic plasticity), covariation at one 
level cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as reflecting a specific process at another level. Similarity 
between patterns of covariation at different levels may be driven by fundamentally different 
mechanisms operating at these different levels. For instance, animals such as birds can be grouped 
according to various levels of taxonomic organisation that are hierarchical with respect to one another, 
ranging from ‘upper’ (e.g., across families and orders) to ‘lower’ (e.g., genera and species).  Even 
though amongst British birds, population size is negatively related to body size across families and 
orders, the relationship between these same variables is reversed across species and genera (Harvey, 
Read, & Nee, 1995; Nee, Read, Greenwood, & Harvey, 1991; Nee, Read, & Harvey, 1996). 
Challenges associated with drawing inferences about individuals from macro-level relationships 
have received substantial attention in the social and biological sciences at large (Cavusgil & Das, 
1997; Gravelle, 1998; Hui & Triandis, 1985; Kievit, Frankenhuis, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2013; Mace & 
Pagel, 1994; Nasif, Al-Daeaj, Ebrahimi, & Thibodeaux, 1991; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997), but such 
discussions remain to be fully integrated into the human evolutionary behavioural sciences (for 
exceptions, see Hawkes, 1994; Nettle, 2009). Our goal here is to facilitate progress in this direction by 
discussing limitations of macro-level data and offering constructive suggestions for interpreting results 
using macro-level data.  
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First, we describe the ecological fallacy, which can occur when statistical patterns observed at one 
level of analysis (e.g., country) are assumed to generalize to other levels of analyses (e.g., covariation 
between individual-level personality traits). Next, we describe two other issues pertinent to between-
population (including cross-cultural) analyses. Thus, we cover three issues relevant to cross-cultural 
correlations, starting with the ecological fallacy (Section 2); then, non-independence of observations 
(Section 3); and finally, cross-cultural non-equivalence in measurement (Section 4). 
 
2. The Ecological Fallacy 
The term “ecological fallacy” became well known after William Robinson (1950) used U.S. 
census data to test hypotheses related to immigration and literacy (see also Menzel, 1950; Thorndike, 
1939). Robinson considered what might be described as a “brain-drain” hypothesis: those who are 
literate are more likely to migrate, and therefore proportions of immigrants within a state will be 
positively related to literacy rates in those states. Consistent with this hypothesis, Robinson (1950) 
found evidence for such a positive relationship between the average literacy of U.S. States and the 
proportion of immigrants living in those states. However, at the individual level, immigrants were less 
likely to be literate than native individuals (see also Schwartz, 1994; Subramanian, Jones, Kaddour, & 
Krieger, 2009; Te Grotenhuis, Eisinga, & Subramanian, 2011 for discussions). The positive state-level 
relationship between proportion of immigrants and literacy rates might have arisen because 
immigrants tended to settle in states with higher literacy levels, perhaps because these states afforded 
better economic opportunities or were otherwise more tolerant of immigrants. Thus, literacy levels are 
higher in some states despite, rather than because of, lower literacy among immigrants. The state-
level literacy statistics at aggregate level did not accurately reflect the literacy of immigrants (and, 
indeed, portrayed a pattern that was opposite to the individual-level pattern). In sum, then, the 
ecological fallacy is committed when group-level relationships are assumed to reflect individual-level 
relationships. The fallacy can occur when group aggregates are incorrectly assumed to be 
representative of individuals within those groups, or when macro-level relationships are governed by 
processes that are unrelated to those hypothesized to operate at the individual-level. In the Robinson 
(1950) study on literacy, for example, the scores at state level were assumed to represent literacy of 
immigrants and non-immigrants equally, whereas at the individual level, immigrants were less likely to 
be literate than non-immigrants. 
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We will illustrate this pattern using a hypothetical example in Figures 2 and 3. We simulated 
data for 11 hypothetical states (with 400 inhabitants each). Next, we generated a pattern whereby 
immigrants have a randomly assigned literacy score between 0 and 100 and locals have a random 
value between 50 and x, where x ranges between 60 and 220 across states (i.e., generally higher than 
that of immigrants). The value of x, however, varies with the proportion of migrants, with states with a 
larger proportion of migrants having a greater x. Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between the 
proportion of migrants and literacy rates at a state level. This pattern might seem to support the “brain 
drain” hypothesis. However, within each state, locals have a higher literacy score than immigrants. 
The gap between migrants and locals in literacy scores is most pronounced in the state with the 
highest proportion of migrants, for which the aggregate data would suggest the highest literacy rate 
amongst migrants. Figure 3 shows that the positive relationship between state literacy level and 
proportion of migrants exists despite there being no change in the literacy of migrants between states.  
--Please insert Figure 2 about here -- 
--Please insert Figure 3 about here -- 
 
Equivalent issues might pertain to recent investigations in the human evolutionary sciences. 
For instance, Thornhill and Fincher (2011) show that U.S. states with higher estimated levels of 
parasite stress have higher rates of romantic partner murder, homicide, and male-honor homicide. 
From these patterns, the authors infer that exposure to parasites during development (i.e., parasite 
stress) has a causal effect on individuals’ propensity for violence. Parasite stress is argued to affect 
individuals’ ingroup sociality, which in turn affects a broader set of interpersonal relationship dynamics 
including violence. However, the critical individual-level patterns within states – arguably, the 
relationship relevant to the research question of whether parasite stress affects values and violence – 
could be absent, weaker, or (as in the literacy example above) reversed, regardless of the state-level 
pattern. Hence, group-level correlations such as these are not particularly relevant to individual-level 
hypotheses. 
The degree to which the ecological fallacy has affected conclusions drawn in the field of 
evolution and human behavior is difficult to estimate. It seems to be the case, however, that even in 
instances where the aggregate measures of central tendency provides a reasonably good descriptor 
of the underlying level, the ecological fallacy can occur. Firebaugh (1978) argued that bias in 
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regression models with aggregated data is absent only in the case when the group mean of the 
independent variable (X) has no effect on the (lower-level) dependent variable Y, with  (lower-level) X 
controlled (also see Sheppard, 2003). However, in many cases in the field of evolution and human 
behavior (e.g., Eppig et al., 2010), this ‘rule’ is difficult to test because data at the lower level are either 
absent or difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, it is clear that the drawing inferences from the incorrect level 
of analysis can lead to inaccurate inferences. Indeed, as in our example and several published others 
(e.g., Connolly, 2006; Dutton, 1994; Yip & Liu, 2006), the relationship can be reversed entirely. We 
note that, in some cases, effects at the underlying level can actually also be stronger than those 
reported at the macrolevel (Piantadosi, Byar, & Green, 1988). Even in cases where there are ample 
data at different levels (e.g. on suicide and socioeconomic status: Rehkopf & Buka, 2006), it is not 
always clear which factors determine the reversal of the relationships between levels and how often 
these reversals occur. The only solution in this case would be to collect more data and empirically 
assess how often the aggregate pattern corresponds to the lower-level pattern. 
 
2.1. Simpson’s Paradox 
When data are aggregated and a change in a statistical relationship can occur due to the 
influence of an unknown variable, This is known as Simpson’s Paradox a specific form of the 
ecological fallacy (Simpson, 1951; Scheiner et al., 2000 for example; Kievit et al., 2013 for review). At 
its most extreme, Simpson’s Paradox is manifested as a reversal in the sign of a relationship between 
analyses at the aggregate and individual-level. Figure 4 illustrates such a case with hypothetical data, 
where within three groups there is a moderate to strong positive relationship between the two 
variables x and y. However, at the aggregate level, the relationship is reversed, and x and y are 
negatively associated. 
 
--Please insert Figure 4 here -- 
 
Several cases of Simpson’s Paradox have been documented in social science literatures. For 
example, a study on voting patterns in recent US presidential elections found a positive relationship 
between a state’s average wealth and the support for the Democratic Party by that state (Gelman, 
Shor, Bafumi, & Park, 2007). However, this association is reversed at the level of individuals: wealthier 
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individuals tend to support the Republican Party, with this relationship being moderated by state 
income. The apparent paradox, in this case, arises because poorer states are more likely to vote 
Republican for reasons other than income. 
2.2 Artificial inflation of effect sizes 
 Next to the complete reversal of the purported effect when examining a lower level rather than 
the aggregate level, the effect size at the aggregate level can be a dramatic overestimate of the effect. 
In psychology, Brand and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that averaging over multiple trials can 
strongly inflate effect size estimates (also see Brand & Bradley, 2012; McCormick, 2013 for discussion 
of this issue). A related issue has been documented in social neuroscience, whereby aggregating 
across voxels, volumetric pixels, used in brain imaging, can inflate effect size (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, 
& Pashler, 2009 and replies). Similar issues of inflation can occur in the context of cross-cultural 
correlations, where aggregation can inflate effect sizes. 
As discussed above for the ecological fallacy, the degree to which the process of aggregation 
influences the effect sizes of cross-cultural correlations is largely unknown, as most of the time data at 
lower levels are either not available or not reported. However, we can provide one specific example 
from the evolutionary behavioral sciences. Researchers have suggested that, because higher levels of 
some Big Five personality traits (namely, extraversion and openness to experience) might increase 
exposure to pathogens, pathogen exposure might partially contribute to the maintenance of variability 
in these personality traits (e.g., Schaller & Murray, 2008). This hypothesis has been tested at a group 
level, where covariation between national averages of personality and national averages of parasite 
prevalence have been examined, and at an individual level, where covariation between individual 
differences in personality and variables posited to reflect investment in pathogen avoidance have been 
examined. At the group level, Schaller and Murray (2008) report that the correlations between national 
averages of parasite prevalence and national averages of extraversion and openness both equal -.59. 
Using an individual differences approach, though, Duncan, Schaller, and Park (2009) report that the 
correlation between individual differences in perceptions of infectibility (e.g., self-reports of infection 
frequency and severity) and extraversion and openness equal -.06 and -.03, respectively. Similarly, 
Tybur and colleagues (2011) report that individual differences in sensitivity to pathogen disgust 
correlate weakly with individual differences in extraversion and openness (-.05 and -.24, respectively; 
see also Tybur & De Vries, 2013). The effect sizes of relationships between other variables measured 
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at the group level in this literature might similarly overestimate the magnitude of relationships at the 
individual level, and effect sizes at the group level should be interpreted with caution. 
2.3. Cross-level Interactions 
Examinations that focus exclusively on cross-cultural correlations are also unable to test for 
possible cross-level interactions, which arise when individuals only behave in particular ways in 
particular environments (Piantadosi et al., 1988; Subramanian et al., 2009). To illustrate, nation-level 
data indicate a positive correlation between per capita meat consumption at a national level and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (York & Gossard, 2004). From this correlation, we may be 
tempted to infer that meat consumption should be relatively higher among wealthier regions. However, 
the true pattern may vary across regions depending on region wealth. Consider meat consumption in 
Belgium as an example. Meat consumption is higher in Wallonia (a poorer region based on GDP) than 
it is in Flanders (a more affluent region) (Vleesbarometer, 2011). From the correlation between meat 
consumption and GDP, we might also be tempted to infer that, within a given group (e.g., region or 
nation), richer individuals would eat more meat.  However, this inference is also unwarranted: the 
relationship could be positive, negative or null. Further, the relationship could be different within 
different groups. Indeed, this seems to be the case. In some developing countries, individual income 
positively relates to (bush)meat consumption (e.g., in Gabon; Wilkie et al., 2005). Meat consumption in 
developing countries can also vary dependent on local markets (Brashares et al., 2004), moreover 
within the same ecosystem the relationship between bushmeat consumption and wealth can differ 
between different populations (Mgawe, Borgerhoff Mulder, Caro, Martin, & Kiffner, 2012). In other 
countries, especially developed countries, income is negatively associated with meat consumption: 
wealthier individuals tend to consume less meat than poorer individuals. In the UK, for instance, the 
top 20% richest households consume 986 grams of meat per person (on average), whereas the 20% 
poorest households consume 1029 grams of meat per person (on average) (DEFRA, 2011). In our 
example, the ecological fallacy would involve extrapolating the relationship between wealth and meat 
consumption from macro-level data to the level of regions or individuals. Such a straightforward 
extrapolation would also ignore the possibility of other factors playing a role, such as the possibility 
that the relationship between meat consumption and wealth can vary as a function of other factors 
such as inequality. Cross-level interactions might allow for a more accurate description of and tests of 
predictions of human behavior, allowing for individual attenuation as a function of characteristics of 
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local environments. The relevance of cross-level interactions has long been recognized in the medical 
sciences where neighborhood or region effects might attenuate individual predispositions towards 
certain risks (e.g., Dahl, Ivar Elstad, Hofoss, & Martin-Mollard, 2006; Von Korff et al., 1992; Winkleby, 
Cubbin, & Ahn, 2006). Similarly, in educational sciences, attributes of the school can interact with traits 
at pupil level to determine learning outcomes (e.g., Bosker, Kremers, & Lugthart, 1990). Cross-level 
interactions might have been largely under-explored in the field of evolution and human behavior in 
favor of a more narrow focus on cross-cultural correlations. 
2.4. How Can The Ecological Fallacy Be Dealt With? 
The examples we described above illustrate some reasons why data patterns at one level of 
analyses (e.g., between nations) are not necessarily informative about processes occurring at other 
levels (e.g., between individuals). Similarities in the direction of effects between studies carried out at 
different levels might, in the worst case, be nothing more than coincidence, and differences between 
patterns at different levels of analysis may be so extreme that relationships at one level are opposite 
to that observed at another level. The fundamental problem that the ecological fallacy illustrates is the 
loss of vital information concerning individual-level processes when aggregates are used as a 
substitute. Aggregate data can be examined in order to investigate questions pertinent to that level of 
variation, but similarity between patterns observed or expected at one level, and those observed at 
another level may be entirely coincidental.  
Researchers in the field of evolution and human behavior could address such challenges by 
developing new longitudinal projects or explore existing databases which cover data on multiple levels 
(e.g., National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (2007); National Child Development Study (n.d.); Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (Golding, Pembrey, & Jones, 2001), Millennium Cohort 
Study (Plewis, Ketende, & Millennium Cohort Study, 2006), and Tracking Adolescents' Individual Lives 
Survey (Huisman et al., 2008). For example, as argued by Nettle (2009), recent hypotheses 
concerning relationships between parasite stress and other variables, such as intelligence, collectivism, 
religiosity, and ingroup investment (e.g., Eppig et al., 2010; Eppig, Fincher, & Thornhill, 2011; Fincher 
& Thornhill, 2012; Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008) could be tested in a more robust 
manner using such data sets. Although these measures typically do not assess parasite stress directly, 
relevant proxies—such as self-reported health, number of doctor visits, number of infections, and 
outcome measures (e.g., intelligence, values)—are available. Importantly, these variables are 
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measured at the appropriate level: for each individual in the sample. An additional benefit is that they 
are measured in a consistent way across different points in time and the chronology of events could 
suggest causal associations in a manner that cross-cultural correlations cannot. Moreover, many of 
the datasets have detailed information on the environment in which individuals developed. This can 
then be meaningfully linked to existing indices of historical pathogen stress (for example, children from 
different regions in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (2007; NLSY) can be compared via 
geocoding). We therefore suggest that stronger tests of many hypotheses derived from the pathogen 
stress model will examine how pathogen stress predicts outcomes such as intelligence, socio-political 
values or criminal behaviour using individual longitudinal designs, such as the NLSY, rather than in 
aggregated data from a single point in time (also see Nettle, 2009). Other opportunities lie in using 
individual-level data from multiple societies to make cross-population comparisons (e.g., Borgerhoff 
Mulder et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2011) or mathematical simulation (for example: for the evolution of 
complex societies: Turchin, Currie, Turner, & Gavrilets, 2013; for developmental processes: 
Frankenhuis & Panchanathan, 2011). 
In the field of evolution and human behavior, many predictions are tested that involve 
interactions between higher and lower levels of analyses (i.e., cross-level interactions: some 
individuals behave in specific ways in particular ecological contexts). For example, individuals who 
were exposed to deprivation during childhood might only speed up their reproductive strategy when 
relevant cues are present in their current environment (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 
2011). Multilevel modeling strategies do not only allow for the correct specification of multiple levels, 
but can be used to test predictions on interactions between higher and lower levels of analyses (for 
reviews, see Gelman & Hill, 2007; Hox, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).  
Although multilevel modeling has occasionally been used for cross-cultural correlational data (e.g., 
Eppig et al., 2010), countries have been nested within regions rather than individuals being nested 
within countries. Although it is difficult to locate data at both the individual and region levels, but 
several resources exist for testing cross-level hypotheses. For example, data on child development 
(e.g., in the NLSY) include descriptions of where children grow up, which can be linked to existing 
databases of historical pathogen stress, as well as data on individual-level pathogen exposure, which 
can be combined to predict intelligence, for example. Moreover, such an approach can differentiate 
between effects of individual exposure to parasites versus historical parasite prevalence in a region, 
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which can inform underlying processes (e.g., cultural evolution via facultative shifts in response to 
ecological conditions versus developmental trade-offs). An additional advantage is that these 
multilevel models can account for the reality that there are many different levels at which meaningful 
variation exists. These models can nest intra-individual variation in individuals who are in turn 
respectively nested into meaningful units such as households, provinces, regions, countries and so 
forth. 
To be clear: we are not arguing that macro-level patterns—at group, societal or cultural 
levels—are uninformative about, or inconsequential for, the study of human behavior. On the contrary, 
cultural evolutionists have developed detailed models examining the conditions in which specific 
individual-level strategies result in particular group-level traits, which in turn affect the adaptive value 
of individual-level strategies (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985). We specifically take aim at inferences 
drawn from group-level data about individual-level processes. We also do not argue that group-level 
data are irrelevant (see Lubinski & Humphreys, 1996; Schwartz, 1994) or cannot be used to test 
hypotheses at the group level. Rather, we stress that statistical relationships at a macro level should 
not be assumed to reflect equivalent relationships at a micro level. Finally, the ecological fallacy does 
not imply that statistical models using individual-level data (or multilevel models) are inherently 
superior to those using group-level data (Piantadosi et al., 1988; Schwartz, 1994). Instead, the 
ecological fallacy shows that mismatches between those levels at which empirical data are gathered 
and analyzed, and those at which hypotheses are formulated, are problematic. 
 
  
3. Secondary Issues With Cross-cultural Correlations 
We will now highlight two issues that are not specific to extrapolation from group-level data to 
individual-level processes, but common to all interpretations of analyses involving cross-cultural 
correlations. Like the ecological fallacy, non-independence of observations and lack of cross-cultural 
equivalence can affect the degree to which inferences can be drawn from observations of cross-
cultural correlations. 
 
3.1. Non-independence of Observations  
Running head: CROSS-CULTURAL CORRELATIONS AND HUMAN NATURE 
 13 
Cross-cultural correlations often suffer from statistical non-independence (also known as 
Galton’s Problem; Mace & Pagel, 1994; Nettle, 2009). This issue has been well-documented and 
widely discussed in anthropology (e.g., Eff, 2004; Naroll, 1965; Ross & Homer, 1976) and sociology 
(e.g., Herkenrath, 2002), but has received minimal attention in work in the field of evolution and human 
behaviour, at least in research relying heavily on cross-cultural correlations. Notably, Currie and Mace 
(2012) and Nettle (2009) have raised the issue of non-independence in reference to tests of the 
parasite stress model with cross-cultural correlations. Even widely used samples, designed to partially 
counter this problem, such as the standard cross-cultural sample (SCCS, Murdock & White, 1969) can 
suffer from this problem (Dow & Eff, 2008; Dow, 2007; Eff, 2004). This problem is not limited to studies 
using aggregated data or studies examining country-level data, in which neighbouring nations (e.g., 
Germany and Austria) may have many similarities not specified in the statistical model (e.g., latitude, 
language, diet). Non-independence of units can lead to erroneous inferences, for example, rather than 
an effect being driven by the identified variable of interest (e.g., pathogen stress, GDP, Inequality), the 
effect could be due to an unspecified third variable (latitude, language, diet, religion).  
 Most inferential statistical techniques work on the premise of random sampling of independent 
observations from some distribution (see Howell, 2010). Violations of this assumption can threaten the 
validity of statistical inference; i.e., researchers might infer that a statistical relationship exists, or does 
not exist, in the population even though this inference is unwarranted because the sample is biased 
(Type I and II errors, respectively). Country- or regional-level data do not generally meet the 
assumption of random sampling, since neighbouring countries or regions are similar to one another in 
many ways.  
Researchers who are conscious of this issue may attempt to account for non-independence by 
statistically controlling for region or continent, or by analyzing at higher macro-levels (e.g., Murdock & 
White's (1969) cultural regions: Fincher et al., 2008). However, non-independence also exists within 
larger geographical clusters. For example, within Europe, Austria is more similar in many respects to 
Germany (shared language, cuisine, medieval and recent history) than it is to France. Also, these 
regional clusters are not independent. For example, in terms of values, due to their shared history, a 
geographical cluster of North America may be more similar to Europe than to sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example. 
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At least three solutions exist to combat this issue. One solution is to employ methods that take 
into account the shared variance between neighbouring countries by modeling the covariance 
between countries, as is done in ‘random effects models’, for example (e.g., McCulloch & Neuhaus, 
2001). These models explicitly incorporate shared variance between countries (modeled as a random 
intercept) as well as the shared variance as a function of shared traits between countries (e.g., social 
inequality; modeled as a random slope). It is also possible to model the effects of autocorrelation at 
different clusters (e.g., as done for the SCCS: Dow & Eff, 2008). A second approach is to construct 
cultural phylogenies (e.g., Mace, Jordan, & Holden, 2003; Mace & Pagel, 1994 for a review; Currie, 
Greenhill, Gray, Hasegawa, & Mace, 2010). Thus far we focused our description of the problem of 
non-independence predominantly on lack of statistical independence, but lack of ‘cultural’ 
independence might be at play as well. We acknowledge that many evolutionary behavioural scientists 
have avoided the issues relating to cross-cultural correlations that we raise by explicitly considering 
that the correlation between traits can be due to their shared cultural history. Analogous to accounting 
for shared variance due to phylogenetic history in biology (e.g., Nee et al., 1996), researchers 
examining the coevolution between cultural traits have used phylogenetic methods to account for 
shared cultural history (Mace et al., 2003; Mace & Pagel, 1994). This use of cultural phylogenies has 
allowed researchers to model shared variance between cultures based on these cultures’ histories 
(inferred from a language phylogeny, for example). If the relationship between two traits remains after 
taking into account shared (cultural) variance, this constitutes evidence that these traits are related 
through some other process. This phylogenetic approach has also allowed for the establishment of a 
chronology of cultural traits. A potential drawback, however, is that this phylogenetic method assumes 
that cultural traits are transmitted faithfully (e.g., Borgerhoff Mulder, Nunn, & Towner, 2006; Borgerhoff 
Mulder, 2001; see Towner, Grote, Venti, & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2012 for a hybrid approach). 
A third possibility, largely unexplored by evolutionary behavioral scientists, is to use spatial 
statistics (e.g., based on GIS mapping, Chang, 2003; Waller & Gotway, 2004). This approach takes 
into account the physical distance between regions, assuming that neighbouring regions are more 
alike. Using the spatial coordinates, researchers can correctly account for the non-independence in 
spatial data. Spatial statistics have been used widely in the field of animal behavior and ecology (e.g., 
Boyce & McDonald, 1999; Brown, Morales, & Summers, 2009; Rushton, Lurz, Fuller, & Garson, 1997; 
Wilkin, Garant, Gosler, & Sheldon, 2006). It is however, possible that the assumption that neighboring 
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regions are similar to each other and that distance is therefore a good proxy for similarity is not always 
upheld. For example, while Austria borders both Germany and Italy, it has more in common with the 
former than the latter in terms of diet, language, for example. A spatial approach might treat the 
difference between Austria and Germany and between Austria and Italy as equal, while a phylogenetic 
approach based on language, would not do so. When the assumption that distance is a reasonable 
proxy for similarity not upheld a phylogenetic approach could be preferred, which could perhaps 
explain, why spatial statistics have not been commonly used in the field of evolution and human 
behaviour. 
 
3.2. Cross-cultural Non-equivalence of Measurement  
When psychologists test hypotheses relevant to group differences on psychological constructs, 
they often compare scores on particular instruments across groups (e.g., Intelligence: the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1981); Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000); Personality: 
the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999); the NEO-PI-R (Costa & MacCrae, 1992), The 
HEXACO model (Ashton & Lee, 2007, 2009; Lee & Ashton, 2004). However, the validity of inferences 
based on these instruments entails multiple, non-trivial assumptions that are not always tested (see 
Byrne & Campbell, 1999; Poortinga, 1989; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Van de Vijver & Tanzer, 
2004). These issues include the degree to which group-level data are acquired using similar sampling 
techniques (e.g., if estimates of some nations’ scores are inferred from samples of college students, 
whereas estimates of other nations’ scores are inferred from foragers), the degree to which methods 
of data collection vary across groups (e.g., some groups are assessed via paper-pencil questionnaire 
versus interview), the degree to which the same assessment method may produce different demand 
characteristics across groups, and in the degree to which factor structures, factor loadings, and item 
intercepts are equivalent across groups. 
Heine, Lehman, Peng, and Greenholtz (2002) highlight one example of the fallibility of cross-
cultural comparisons based on self-reports: the “reference group effect”. Put simply, the validity of 
group-level data (i.e., means of individuals within those groups) can be attenuated by the degree to 
which self-report responses reflect comparisons to norms within a group. For example, self-reported 
height (a seven point scale of “How tall are you,” with 1 = not tall and 7 = very tall) might yield the 
same group mean in India and the Netherlands despite large group differences in actual height. The 
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same issue applies to individual difference variables commonly used by psychologists (e.g., 
collectivism; see Heine et al., 2002). Simple differences in the interpretation of a concept within an 
item (or set of items) may influence inferences in a manner independent from the construct of interest. 
Indeed, Heine, Buchtel, and Norenzayan (2008) find that, whereas group-level aggregates of self-
reported conscientiousness correlate poorly with theoretically-relevant behavioral measures (e.g., 
group-average walking speed, clock accuracy), perceptions of national averages of conscientiousness 
(so, the degree to which an individual rates their culture as conscientious, relative to the U.S.; 
Terracciano et al., 2005) related strongly to these indices. 
 Moving beyond self-report methodology can reduce some, though not all, issues concerning 
cross-group equivalency in measurement. For example, comparisons of murder rates across groups 
are influenced by multiple factors, including whether or not groups differ in the number of murders, 
whether the same act is classified as “murder” in one group versus “manslaughter” or “negligence” in 
another group, and whether groups differ in the proportion of murders that are reported and/or 
detected by authorities. Findings of group differences in murder rates could indicate actual differences 
in violence between groups, or they could reflect other factors, such as group differences in funding of 
police units investigating murders or differences in the criteria by which a death is categorized as a 
murder. As another example, Wolff, Chong, and Auffhammer (2011) recently showed that, due to a 
variety of errors, some estimates—such as Gini coefficients—based on values of the Human 
Development index deviate from the true value by up to 100%. They also found that as much as 34% 
of the countries were misclassified in this widely used UN source (Anand & Sen, 1994; United Nations 
Development Programme, 2001). Finally, in anthropology there have been longstanding debates on 
whether, when increasing the scale of comparison (e.g. moving from local comparisons within a region 
to comparisons across regions), some traits can still be compared or whether this amounts to making 
invalid comparisons (e.g., Holý, 1987; J. H. Moore, 1994; White et al., 1988). For example, bridewealth 
payments might occur in both New Guinea and East Africa, but can serve vastly different functions 
(Comaroff, 1980) and differ to such an extent that they should not be interpreted as measuring the 
same phenomenon. Therefore, comparisons within a region might be necessary and more valuable in 
understanding the coevolution of traits than global comparisons (see Eggan, 1954; Hammel, 1980), 
simply because otherwise one could run the risk of comparing ‘apples with oranges’. While such 
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focussed analyses might have limited generalizability, they might provide a better test for the 
coevolution of certain traits.  
In conclusion, many studies examining cross-cultural correlations draw upon secondary data 
(i.e., data collected by another research team). To attenuate challenges to inference caused by non-
equivalence in measurement, researchers should be careful to evaluate (and report) evidence for the 
validity of measures before assuming cross-cultural equivalence. Such evidence can include 
techniques modeling response differences (e.g., King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2003) or 
measurement invariance (e.g., via Structural Equation Modeling: MacCallum & Austin, 2000) across 
groups. For example via Structural Equation Modeling we can compare a model where a latent 
variable is considered to be invariant across different cultures versus a model where this is allowed to 
vary (e.g., Byrne & Campbell, 1999; Byrne, 2009). For a more in-depth review, we refer to other work 
on cross-cultural measurement (e.g., Hui & Triandis, 1985; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997, 2000). 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
There is great merit in cross-cultural work in evolution and human behaviour. In addition to 
recent work focusing on comparing individuals from different populations (e.g., Little, Apicella, & 
Marlowe, 2007; Stephen et al., 2012; Tovée, Swami, Furnham, & Mangalparsad, 2006), there has 
been a surge in work testing hypotheses via cross-cultural correlations. These studies have several 
merits (e.g., moving beyond unrepresentative, Western populations, Henrich et al., 2010), but also 
have several limitations. Many recent examples in the human evolutionary behavioural sciences, 
described in the introduction, demonstrate that is tempting to interpret these group-level data as 
informative about individual-level adaptation (e.g., the effect of parasite stress on life-history 
development). However, such inferences are inherently limited in part by the issues discussed here: 
the ecological fallacy, non-independence of observations, and cross-cultural non-equivalence of 
measurement. Many of the issues we discussed apply to a broad range of research areas where 
cross-cultural correlations are presented as evidence for individual-level hypotheses; for instance, 
research on sex ratios (e.g., Dama, 2011), parent-offspring conflict (e.g., Apostolou, 2010), or 
intelligence (e.g., Kanazawa, 2006). We hope that novel hypotheses derived from evolutionary theory 
continue to be tested with increasingly sophisticated and robust methods, e.g., by comparing 
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individuals from different cultures (e.g, Stephen et al., 2012), by combining many individual-level 
samples from small scale societies (e.g., Borgerhoff Mulder et al., 2009), or by modeling techniques 
(e.g., Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & Barrett, 2013). Such approaches could allow researchers to 
make better inferences on human nature than cross-cultural correlations may allow for.  
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Figure 1. Three levels at which hypotheses can be analyzed: between groups, between individuals 
within groups, and within individuals over time. Note: Interactions between levels might exist as well; 
for instance, if the differences between individuals, or the developmental trajectories of individuals, 
differ between groups. 
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Figure 2: Example of aggregated relationship between proportion of migrants and literacy rates at 
state level with simulated data. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between migrant status and literacy scores within three hypothetical states 
(simulated data; proportion of .02; .10 and .28 from Figure 2). Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure 4: Illustration of Simpson’s paradox. Within each group the association between X and Y is 
positive. However, at aggregate level the relationship is reversed. Solid lines are Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) Regression for each subgroup; dashed lines represent OLS fit and 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
